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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay examines the aesthetic functionality doctrine and the
fact patterns of three recent cases where the doctrine should apply.
The facts of these cases highlight how the aesthetic functionality
doctrine could be applied to protect creativity and competition, and
ensure robust freedom of expression. Importantly, this essay stresses
that the doctrine should be considered in light of the vigorous policing
of marks by mark owners, expanding trademark law protection and the
benefits of aesthetic functionality over other tests.
Part I of this article sets forth an introduction. Part II provides a
brief background of the problem of supposed “trademark bullying,”
“trademark extortion,” or “aggressive trademark litigation tactics.”
Part III reviews the functionality doctrine and the policies animating it.
Part IV analyzes three cases as examples of how the aesthetic
functionality doctrine could effectively protect creativity, competition
and freedom of expression. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. POLICING TRADEMARKS
The subject matter and scope of protection of trademark law has
expanded tremendously in the last 70 years.1 This expansion has
occurred because of the confluence of several important factors,
including: new technology, such as the Internet; the value and
importance of the brand—with valuations exceeding $60 billion for
one brand; 2 and the use of trademarks to protect licensing and
merchandising markets, which may generate as much as $187.2 billion
in the sale of licensed products worldwide,3 including over $3.9 billion
for collegiate merchandising alone. 4 Other contributing factors
1

See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 368–72
(1999) (explaining trademark expansion); Kenneth L. Port, The Expansion
Trajectory: Trademark Jurisprudence in the Modern Age, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 474, 476-77 (2010) (discussing expansion, including availability of
federal incontestability status and intent to use applications, expanded section 43(a)
liability, dilution, and anti-cybersquatting law).
2
See
Best
Global
Brands
2012,
INTERBRAND,
http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-brands/2012/Best-Global-Brands2012.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
3
See The Top 125 Global Licensors, GLOBAL LICENSE! (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://www.licensemag.com/license-global/top-125-global-licensors. Notably, “The
Top 125 Global Licensors accounted for about $165 billion in retail sales of licensed
products representing almost 90 percent of the total market of $187.2 billion
worldwide.”
4
See id. (“THE COLLEGIATE LICENSING COMPANY” (IMG COMPANY)
$3.9B (PRIVATE), representing the total college market) (emphasis omitted).

2013]!
!

[THE!NUCLEAR!OPTION]%

283!

include the expansion and importance of international markets, and the
nature of trademark law itself.5 The scope of trademark rights is
pushed by consumer perception, which to some extent is controlled by
trademark holders and their risk adverse lawyers who vigilantly police
their marks to protect their clients’ valuable brands, and lobby
Congress for expanded trademark protection. 6 The policing of
trademarks is driven by trademark doctrine and policy which partially
provide the incentive to do so.7
This last issue—the vigorous policing of marks has led to so-called
“trademark bullying” or “trademark extortion” through the use of
cease and desist letters with the threat of litigation by companies with
resources against entities with presumably less resources.8 Attorneys
(of clients of any size and amount of resources) should police their
clients’ marks to ensure that those marks continue to receive a broad
scope of trademark protection. 9 Thus, if there is any arguable
5

See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1916 (2007) (“Producers are able to frame just about
any argument for broader protection in terms of consumer expectations, which they
are in position to influence systematically through marketing. Moreover, once courts
and Congress began to expand trademark law and committed it to consumer
understanding, expansion became self-reinforcing—broader protection begets
consumer expectations of greater control, which begets even broader protection.”);
James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 907-08 (2007) (explaining why licensing markets emerge when no
licenses are needed); Michael A. Johnson, The Waning Consumer Protection
Rationale of Trademark Law: Overprotective Courts and the Path to Stifling PostSale Consumer Use, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1320, 1355 (2011) (“The proliferation of
product placements, cease and desist letters from mark owners in response to
unauthorized post-sale uses, and overly protectionist court decisions have all shaped
consumer expectations so that consumers now believe that virtually any post-sale use
of a mark must be authorized.”); Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and
Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L.
REV. 427, 439 (2011) (“[T]he structure of trademark law itself, given the focus of
trademark law on consumer perception, results in the vigorous enforcement and
policing of trademark rights by trademark holders.”).
6
Mireles, supra note 5, at 439.
7
Id.
8
Recently, an alleged victim of so-called “trademark bullying” established a
website for the discussion of issues surrounding trademark bullying.
See
TrademarkBullying.org:
No
Form
of
Harassment
is
Okay,
http://trademarkbullying.org/Home_Page.html (last visited May 20, 2013). Notably,
there does not appear to be a universally accepted definition of “trademark bullying.”
See Trevor Little, International - List of the Top ‘Trademark Bullies’ Renews Debate
on Enforcement Strategies, WORLD TRADEMARK REV., (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/daily/detail.aspx?g=8fc00cc3-ebe7-466fa124-89d93d84f031 (last visited May 20, 2013).
9
Mireles, supra note 5, at 439.
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infringing or diluting conduct, the zealous (prudent) lawyer sends a
cease and desist letter which, in some cases, may dampen creativity
and competition, and chill potential expression.10 In one particularly
interesting case, Salu, Inc. v. Original Skin Store, the court stated:
[Plaintiff] Salu presents evidence that . . . [it] has
continually contacted anyone who it feels is infringing
in order to protect its mark. It has sent out over 300
cease and desist letters to alleged infringers in the last
couple of years alone. Salu claims that with the
exception of ESKINSTORE, this litigation, and one
other case that settled out of court, “every other
infringer receives [the] letter and stops infringing on
[the] trademark.”11
The topic of “trademark bullying” or “trademark extortion” has
received a significant amount of attention. The United States Patent
and Trademark Office [USPTO] recently requested public comment
on trademark overreaching—bullying—and issued a study on the
subject.12 The request for comments initially used the word “bullies”
or “bully” but eventually changed the title to “trademark litigation
tactics.” The reason for the change may be, in part, because there
appears to be a lack of consensus about what “trademark bullying”
means. The failure to agree on the definition may be the result of a
belief by some that all so-called “bullying” that may fall under some
definitions of “trademark bullying” may not be negative in light of
trademark law so as to justify such a label.13
Trademark bullying, at the least, seems to include litigation tactics
that may involve using cease and desist letters and threats of litigation,
where a trademark holder with more resources than a target entity
10

See William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 1206-07 (2008) (“Considerable
anecdotal evidence suggests that the real action occurs outside the courthouse:
markholders send cease-and-desist letters and threaten legal action against those
using trademarks to facilitate speech, and the recipients frequently capitulate.”).
11
Salu, Inc. v. Original Skin Store, No. CIV. S-08-1035 FCD/KJM, 2010 WL
1444617, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010) (internal citations omitted).
12
See USPTO.gov, Request for Comments: Trademark Litigation Tactics, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/bullies_survey.jsp
(last updated Jan. 31, 2012 10:34:43 AM). The Secretary of Commerce was directed
to investigate trademark litigation tactics by Congress. See Trademark Technical
and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-146, 124 Stat. 66.
13
Professor McCarthy cautions that a trademark “enforcement program [should
be] neither overly lax nor overly aggressive.” See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:91 (4th ed. 2008).
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asserts rights beyond the reasonable scope of its mark.14 For example,
a trademark holder might assert its rights against a small business or
artist that is using the mark in a way that would be protected under the
law because of First Amendment interests.
The April 2011 USPTO Trademark Litigation Study described the
results of its request for comments and outlined some of its planned
activities to address trademark bullying.15 In summarizing some of the
comments, the Trademark Litigation Study notes that:
Most of the direct respondents claimed at least some
degree of first-hand knowledge of instances where
unduly aggressive trademark litigation or pre-litigation
tactics (e.g., cease-and-desist letters) were targeted at a
small business. Many of these were directly involved
in the issuance or receipt of cease-and-desist letters. . . .
When asked if they currently encounter the problem of
other trademark owners using their trademark rights to
harass and intimidate another business beyond what the
law might be reasonably interpreted to allow (e.g., is
“trademark bullying a problem”), few commenters
explicitly addressed whether and to what extent this
issue is a significant problem. Given the limited
number of comments and the varied nature of the
commenters own experiences, the comments may be
14

Based on some enforcement of trademark rights, perhaps bullying should
include what should be beyond a trademark holder’s scope of rights and is in its
rights, as opposed to what actually is outside their rights. Some interesting cases of
“trademark bullying” include enforcement of trademarks by professional sports
teams against high schools. See Randall L. Newsome, Cease and Desist: Finding an
Equitable Solution In Trademark Disputes Between High Schools and Colleges, 52
B.C. L. REV. 1833, 1853-63, 1868 (2011) (arguing that high schools may have a very
good case against trademark infringement, but noting the ambiguity in whether high
schools may infringe the trademarks of colleges). For a discussion of some of the
other costs of aggressive trademark enforcement, see David E. Armendariz, Picking
on the Little Guy? Asserting Trademark Rights Against Fans, Emulators and
Enthusiasts, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1259, 1276-80 (2012).
15
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRADEMARK LITIGATION
TACTICS AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND
PREVENT
COUNTERFEITING
(2011)
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/notices/TrademarkLitigationStudy.pdf (last visited
May 20, 2013) [TRADEMARK LITIGATION STUDY]. This study has been criticized by
many. See e.g., Adam Smith, USPTO Silent as Attorneys Pour Scorn on Trademark
Bullies
Study,
WORLD
TRADEMARK
REV.
(May
9,
2011),
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/daily/detail.aspx?g=54efa7ab-20b1-41c1a8a5-4cbd8548e08f; Timothy J. Callery, Baiting the Hook: The Failure of the PTO
Trademark Litigation Tactics Report To Dissuade Either Trademark Bullying or
Trademark Baiting, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 909 (2012).

2! 86!

WAKE!FOREST!J.!
BUS.!&!INTELL.!PROP.!L.%

[VOL.!13!

better viewed as anecdotal.16
The Trademark Litigation Study also stated that:
A handful of small business owners explained that they
withdrew their trademark applications after receiving a
cease-and-desist letter because they lacked the time or
financial resources to litigate against a larger, wealthier
company. This imbalance of resources was a common
theme among many of the comments concerned with
the threat of litigation, including one noting that
litigation is too expensive to be a realistic option for
many small businesses. Other commenters, however,
recognized that cease-and-desist letters have a
legitimate purpose, explaining that most are sent in
good faith, and only a small percentage result from
overzealous protection of a mark. Some commenters
explained that trademark owners have an obligation to
police their marks, and the cease-and-desist letter is a
necessary, cost-effective part of the process.17
The results of the Trademark Litigation Study appear to be
inconclusive and are perhaps helpful as a starting point for gathering
more information about “trademark bullying.” 18 However, the
Trademark Litigation Study does seem to indicate that “trademark
bullying” could be happening, but based on the comments received,
also hedges on whether litigation enforcement activity that has
occurred should be labeled “bullying.” 19 There is no doubt that
companies send cease and desist letters to one another, but whether
those particular instances merit the label “trademark bullying” appears
to be hard to justify based on the comments received by the USPTO.20
Two other studies provide additional support for the argument that
trademark bullying exists.21
The first is the study by Professor Port, which concluded that
trademark extortion may explain why there is a rise in filings of
16

TRADEMARK LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 15, at 18.
Id. at 18-19.
18
See generally id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585, 631 (2008). See also William T. Gallagher, Trademark
and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L. J. 453, 496 (2012).
17
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trademark cases, but fewer reported decisions.22 The second study by
Professor Gallagher found that:
[T]rademark and copyright lawyers and their clients
sometimes enforce admittedly weak IP claims precisely
because it can be an effective strategy with few
downsides. As this study shows, aggressive trademark
and copyright enforcement efforts often work, as
enforcement targets frequently choose to capitulate or
settle rather than resist claims on the legal merits, likely
due to the costs and uncertainties inherent in IP
litigation. Thus, this study supports the thesis that
trademarks and copyrights can be and often are overenforced in everyday legal practice.23
While the USPTO Trademark Litigation Study focused on the
impact of aggressive trademark litigation tactics on small businesses, it
is noteworthy that the Chilling Effects Clearinghouse database, which
attempts to collect examples of intellectual property overreaching
through cease and desist letters, has mostly trademark cease and desist
letters sent to Google since 2011 under a search for “trademark”—
with almost no cease and desist letters sent to small businesses.24 This
does not mean that companies are not sending cease and desist letters
to small companies and overreaching (see the case involving Salu, Inc.
mentioned above), but that small companies and others may not be
reporting them to the Chilling Effects Clearinghouse website. The
Brand Geek blog offered to start collecting problematic cease and
desist letters, but as of May 20, 2013, none have been posted.25 The
Legal Force Trademarkia has, however, published data concerning
oppositions filed by “trademark bullies”—there are many examples,
and the most bullied and the biggest bullies are available for view.26
22

Port, supra note 21, at 633.
Gallagher, supra note 21, at 496.
24
See CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/ (last
visited May 20, 2013); see also “Trademark” Search Results, id. (click “Search the
Database”; then type in keyword “trademark”; then click the “Submit Search”
button).
25
Lara Pearson, Brand Bully Basement, BRAND GEEK (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://brandgeek.net/2011/10/10/brand-bully-basement/. There is one opposition
proceeding posted concerning Nestle. Id. It is unfortunate that people are not
reporting instances of bullying.
26
See Find a Trademark Bully, LEGALFORCE TRADEMARKIA,
http://www.trademarkia.com/opposition/opposition-brand.aspx (last visited June 7,
2013). However, the website appears to fail to discuss why those oppositions
include bullying behavior and not just solid trademark enforcement.
23
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There have also been several well-publicized incidents involving
cease and desist letters. For example, Louis Vuitton sent a cease and
desist letter to a student intellectual property law group at the
University of Pennsylvania because of their advertising for a
symposium on fashion law.27 Another example is the cease and desist
letter and subsequent interaction between publishing house Penguin
and former Penguin author David Thorne,28 although there does not
seem to be a Penguin cease and desist letter for Mr. Thorne’s use of
the Penguin logo on his blog.29 Finally, there is the very popular,
supposedly successful, cease and desist letter story concerning Jack
Daniels.30 Many seem to believe that this particular cease and desist
letter by Jack Daniels was well done.31
Notably, a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Already, LLC v. Nike,
Inc.,32 provides an example of supposed trademark bullying. In that
case, Nike alleged that its Air Force 1 trademark was infringed and
diluted by Already’s shoe lines “Sugars” and “Soulja Boys.” 33
Already “filed a counterclaim contending that the Air Force 1
trademark is invalid.”34 Apparently, Nike, fearing loss of its Air Force
1 trademark, submitted a “Covenant Not to Sue,” essentially stating
that it “would not raise against Already or any affiliated entity any
trademark or unfair competition claim based on any of Already’s
existing footwear designs” or “colorable imitation[s].” 35 In this
particular case, Nike, an entity with substantial resources, apparently
enforced its trademark against a small entity.36 The question arises
whether Nike’s infringement and dilution claims were overreaching.
Here, that seems to be the case. When the validity of its mark was
challenged, Nike, “four months after Already counterclaimed,” issued

27

See Charles Coleman, Louis Vuitton Sends Absurd Cease-and-Desist Letter to
Penn Law Over Student Event Flyer (And More Fun with Trademark Abuse!), L.
FASHION BLOG (Mar. 3, 2012), http://lawoffashion.com/blog/story/03/03/2012/121.
28
See 27B/6, http://www.27bslash6.com/covers.html (last visited May 20,
2013).
29
Id.
30
See Charlie Minato, Jack Daniels Wrote What Has to Be the Nicest Ceaseand-Desist Order of All Time, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 23, 2012),
http://www.businessinsider.com/jack-daniels-wrote-what-has-to-be-the-nicest-ceaseand-desist-order-of-all-time-2012-7.
31
Id.
32
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013).
33
Id. at 725.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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the “Covenant Not to Sue” and moved to dismiss the case. 37
Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court did not allow Already to
pursue its counterclaim because the claim was moot, thus allowing
Nike to continue to threaten third parties with trademark claims based
on its Air Force 1 mark.38
While a different competitor may also challenge Nike’s mark, they
must have the resources to do so and may face bullying of another
kind—importantly, in this case, Already also asserted that “Nike had
intimidated retailers into refusing to carry Already’s shoes.” 39
Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence notes that, “[O]ver the past
eight months, Nike has cleared out the worst offending infringers.
Now Already remains as one of the last few companies that was
identified on that top ten list of infringers.”40 Justice Kennedy also
discussed some of the harms that can occur from the threat of
trademark infringement:
[C]harges of trademark infringement can be disruptive
to the good business relations between the
manufacturer alleged to have been an infringer and its
distributors, retailers, and investors.
The mere
pendency of litigation can mean that other actors in the
marketplace may be reluctant to have future dealings
with the alleged infringer.41
The anticompetitive impact for trademark overreaching in some cases
is real.42
This context of vigorous policing is an important backdrop for a
discussion of aesthetic functionality and illuminates the problem.43
37

Id.
Id. at 733.
39
Id. at 725-26. As the Supreme Court notes, the trademark holder has an
incentive not to allow third party use, including issuing many covenants not to sue,
and that a trademark holder may have to pay an alleged infringer’s attorney’s fees in
exceptional cases. Id. at 731-32.
40
Id. at 734.
41
Id. at 733-34.
42
For a discussion of the societal harms of abusive trademark litigation tactics,
See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 65052 (2011) (discussing “reduction in competition” and harm to “'cultural expression
and free speech’”).
43
Another way to combat abusive trademark litigation tactics is by “shaming.”
See id. at 653-54. For a discussion of how other judicial sanctions may be incapable
of stopping trademark bullying and a proposal for an administrative solution, see
Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 858-71 (2012). Commentators have also proposed the
adoption of a trademark notice and take down system similar to the Digital
continued . . .
38
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The problem is not just unclear law. The problem is unclear law in the
context of attorneys—notably zealously representing their clients—
vigorously enforcing their clients’ marks to their broadest arguable
extent under evolving consumer perception.44
III. FUNCTIONALITY LAW
Functionality law is anything but clear. 45 Depending on the
jurisdiction, there are two types of functionality: aesthetic and
utilitarian.46
There are arguably two rationales for the functionality doctrine: 1)
to ensure that trademark law does not provide perpetual legal
protection for subject matter better protected by utility patent law; and
2) to protect and promote competition.47 Most would probably agree
that both rationales can apply to utilitarian type functionality, but most
likely would agree only the latter justifies aesthetic type
functionality.48
Importantly, if functionality applies, either aesthetic or utilitarian,
that means that the mark holder’s trademark cannot receive legal
Millennium Copyright Act to prevent trademark bullying. See Jason R. Brege &
Kelli A. Ovies, Taking Down Trademark Bullying: Sketching the Contours of a
Trademark Notice and Takedown Statute, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 391 (2012).
44
The problem may have been exacerbated by the recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision, Already v. Nike, which may allow a trademark holder to escape a challenge
to its mark by unilaterally issuing a “Covenant Not to Sue.” Already, 133 S. Ct. at
733-34. This removes a potential check on abusive trademark litigation tactics—the
opportunity for the supposed infringer or diluter to eliminate the trademark holder’s
mark. Id.
45
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 158-59 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the differing
justifications of the functionality doctrine); see also Elizabeth W. King, The
Trademark Functionality Doctrine: Recast for Comprehension, 5 LANDSLIDE 20, 21
(2012) (“For decades, trademark practitioners have wrestled with the functionality
doctrine.”). For additional analysis of functionality doctrine, see generally Mark P.
McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823 (2011).
46
Id. Notably, at least two circuits have not adopted it or may not recognize the
doctrine at all. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v.
Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 487-88 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We do not believe that
the Court's dictum in TrafFix requires us to abandon our long-settled view rejecting
recognition of aesthetic functionality.”); Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N.
Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 418 (6th Cir. 2012) (“It seems we have not yet plainly
stated which test we would apply under aesthetic functionality doctrine, . . . or that
we have even adopted aesthetic functionality doctrine at all . . . We need not decide
these questions today.”).
47
Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 550 F.3d at 487.
48
Id.
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protection notwithstanding the mark’s ability to serve as a
trademark—generally to serve to identify and distinguish one person’s
goods or services from another and to indicate the source of those
goods or services.49 Thus, functionality and the policies that drive it
trump other concerns in trademark law such as protecting the goodwill
of the trademark owner or preventing consumer confusion.50
An additional lack of clarity in functionality law concerns the
standards for when functionality exists and how to apply those
standards.51 In the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of
functionality in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., the
Court stated that the test for functionality asks whether the claimed
trade dress is essential to the use or purpose of the article or affects its
cost or quality.52 Thus, a product design may be functional if the
appearance of a product impacts how it works, or its cost or quality—a
dual spring design is a cost effective way to allow road signs to flex
and remain upright in adverse wind conditions.53 The Court also noted
that after applying that test, courts could inquire as to whether the
trade dress put competitors at a non-reputation related disadvantage—
something not because of the functions of the trademark.54
In determining if the second test is met, a court may inquire into
competitive necessity or whether there are alternatives to the claimed
trade dress.55 Thus, if someone claimed the color black in connection
with boat motors, the exclusive use of that color in connection with
those goods would put competitors at a non-reputation related
disadvantage, even though the color does not affect how the motor
works.56 The color can serve to make the motor look smaller and the
color black matches many boat colors.57 And, there are no alternatives
to black to serve those purposes, so a competitor needs to use that
color.58 The TrafFix Devices, Inc. court seemed to indicate that the
second test was to be applied in cases of aesthetic functionality and not
utilitarian functionality, but that could be interpreted to mean that the
49

See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001)
(“Functionality having been established, whether [MDI's dual-spring] design has
acquired secondary meaning need not be considered.”).
50
See id.
51
See generally id. at 32.
52
Id. at 35.
53
See generally id.
54
Id. at 33.
55
Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531-32 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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utilitarian or aesthetic functionality inquiry involves applying both
tests, and if either is satisfied, then the mark is functional and not
protected.59
Besides the benefit for certainty in the law, the aesthetic
functionality doctrine should be clarified because it may serve to
protect wide vistas of the creative arts and competition, and ensure
robust freedom of expression. The potential benefits of the doctrine
are particularly important because the subject matter of trademarks has
expanded to protect almost any symbol that can be perceived as a
trademark, including subject matter traditionally protected by
copyright law—and it is continuously expanding. 60 For example,
subject matter that may be protected by trademark law includes motion
marks; colors, including a single color; music; three-dimensional
objects; and holographs.61
Three recent cases highlight the expansion of trademark
protection—in light of overreaching trademark claims by trademark
holders—and how the aesthetic functionality doctrine may serve to
reign in expansive trademark protection in the context of vigorous
policing of trademarks.62
IV. THE CASES AND THE APPLICATION OF THE AESTHETIC
FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE
The following three recent cases provide some context to how the
aesthetic functionality doctrine could be applied to protect creativity,
59

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that
color alone can be protected by trademark law); In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1238, 1239 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (holding that fragrance functions as a trademark); In re
Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 562-64 (T.T.A.B. 1978)
(Lefkowitz, J.) (holding that sound can function as a trademark); Jerome Gilson &
Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and Cherry-Scented
Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773,
773 (2005) (discussing non-traditional marks); Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson
LaLonde, Getting Real with Nontraditional Trademarks: What’s Next After Red
Oven Knobs, the Sound of Burning Methamphetamine, and Goats on a Grass Roof,
101 TRADEMARK REP. 186, 193-208 (2011) (reviewing non-traditional marks
protected by trademark law).
61
See generally Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Getting Real with
Nontraditional Trademarks: What’s Next After Red Oven Knobs, the Sound of
Burning Methamphetamine, and Goats on a Grass Roof, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 186,
193-214 (2011).
62
For an argument against aesthetic functionality, see Tracy Reilly, Betty Boop
Almost Lost Her “Bling-Bling”: Fleischer Studies v. A.V.E.L.A. and the ReEmergence of Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Merchandising Cases, 94 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 95, 120-31 (2012).
60
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competition and free expression.
This section also provides
suggestions for the application of that doctrine.
The facts of the first two cases involve so-called defensive
aesthetic functionality doctrine. Under this doctrine, if it applies, a
court does not declare that the mark receives no protection in all
circumstances as under an ordinary aesthetic functionality analysis.
The court determines that the particular infringer’s use of the
trademark is aesthetically functional and the alleged infringer can thus
continue using the mark.63
The first case involves two 2011 Ninth Circuit opinions and the
famous character “Betty Boop.” 64 In Fleischer Studios, Inc. v.
A.V.E.L.A. Inc., one party claimed trademark protection over Betty
Boop—her image, and word and character marks—and tried to stop
another party from selling Betty Boop dolls, T-shirts, and handbags
with her image.65 The Ninth Circuit, in its first opinion, decided that
the alleged infringers’ use was covered by aesthetic functionality and
the alleged mark holder could not stop that use.66 The court reasoned,
following the controversial International Order of Job’s Daughters v.
Lindeburg & Co. 67 decision, that A.V.E.L.A. was not using Betty
Boop as a trademark but instead as a functional product and that Betty
Boop was a prominent feature of the product, and A.V.E.L.A. never
designated the merchandise as “official” or otherwise indicated
sponsorship. 68 The court noted that there was no evidence of
confusion.69
The court, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,70 also essentially stated
that trademark protection should not extend to a copyrighted work
such as the Betty Boop character because then that character would
never enter the public domain and this would frustrate copyright law.71
63

For a discussion of defensive aesthetic functionality, see Anthony L. Fletcher,
Defensive Aesthetic Functionality: Deconstructing the Zombie, 101 TRADEMARK
REP. 1687 (2011).
64
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir.),
withdrawn and superseded by Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d
958 (9th Cir. 2011).
65
Id. at 1117-18, 1122.
66
Id. at 1122-24.
67
Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th
Cir. 1980).
68
A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 636 F.3d at 1124.
69
Id.
70
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
71
A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d at 1124. For a recent discussion of Dastar, see
Mark P. McKenna, Dastar’s Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357 (2012).
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Interestingly, after the filing of several amicus briefs by parties such as
the Motion Picture Association, the International Trademark
Association, and others, the Ninth Circuit withdrew the opinion and
substituted it for another opinion relying on other grounds concerning
an incomplete chain of title.72 Even in light of this withdrawal, some
trademark lawyers have expressed concern that the Ninth Circuit did
not explain why its prior opinion was wrong.73 Because of this lack of
explanation, the Ninth Circuit may have opened up the door to the use
of defensive aesthetic functionality which could mean the end of
licensing and merchandising, and the loss of billions of dollars to their
clients. 74 Indeed, on remand, the district court found that the
defendants’ use of the word mark “Betty Boop” was aesthetically
functional. In analyzing aesthetic functionality, the district court
reasoned that:
Because, as noted above, Defendants' use of the mark is
a decorative feature of their merchandise and is not
source-identifying, “protection of the feature as a
trademark would impose a significant non-reputationrelated competitive disadvantage” on Defendants.
Were Defendants to market their goods bearing the
image of Betty Boop or Betty Boop movie posters
without the words Betty Boop to identify the character,
that would make their products less marketable than the
same product that included the BETTY BOOP name.
72

Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011).
See e.g., Nancy Clare Morgan, Aesthetic Appeal: The Blending of Aesthetics
and Usefulness in Design Can Result in Challenges to the Theoretical Foundation of
Trademark Law, L.A. LAW, Feb. 2012, at 36, 38 (2012); see also Lee B. Burgunder,
The Scoop on Betty Boop: A Proposal to Limit Overreaching Trademarks, 32 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 257, 257 (2012) (“The Ninth Circuit temporarily stunned
marketers in 2011 when it ruled that Betty Boop did not serve as a trademark on
merchandise due to aesthetic functionality and because protection would conflict
with the copyright system. The opinion endangered merchandising rights in all
trademarks and jeopardized the duration of trademark rights in images and media
characters. The court soon withdrew the decision and substituted it with one that
denied protection on technical grounds, leaving the controversies for another day.”)
and Charles E. Colman, A Red-Leather Year for Aesthetic Functionality, 4
LANDSLIDE 26, 30 (2011) (“It is difficult--perhaps impossible--to know what to
make of the A.V.E.L.A. saga.
Although the panel withdrew its aesthetic
functionality-based opinion, the decision that took its place notably declined to
endorse the position advocated by the above-mentioned amici—that Auto Gold is
still the law of the Ninth Circuit. The panel's second opinion likewise declined to
adopt INTA's characterization of Job's Daughters as “outdated and muchcriticized.”).
74
Burgunder, supra note 73, at 258.
73
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This is because the words Betty Boop serve to name the
famous character depicted on those goods and are part
and parcel of the movie posters printed on Defendants'
merchandise. For example, Plaintiff points to one of
Defendants' dolls that includes packaging bearing
imagery from a Betty Boop movie poster, and a product
tag that is a miniature reproduction of the movie poster.
Both uses of the poster imagery bear the following text:
“Adolph Zukor presents BETTY BOOP with HENRY
the Funniest Living American”. Removing the words
BETTY BOOP from these items would render the
textual aspect of the poster reproductions incomplete
and the remaining words would be nonsensical. It
would be obvious to the average consumer that such
merchandise would be missing something. Clearly,
merchandise that is missing something is less
marketable and therefore at a competitive disadvantage.
In addition, because Defendants' use of the Betty Boop
word mark is not source identifying and simply does
not trade on the “reputation” of any source, barring
Defendants from using those words would “impose a
significant
non-reputation-related
competitive
75
disadvantage.”
The district court’s opinion provides a glimmer of hope that aesthetic
functionality can be effectively applied by courts, at least in the
context of word marks, but the question remains whether other courts
will follow it.
The second case involves the University of Alabama and an
artist.76 In that case, the University of Alabama sued an artist for
trademark infringement.77 The artist painted limited edition paintings
of famous plays with University of Alabama football players wearing
crimson and white uniforms. 78 The infringement theory was
apparently that consumers could believe there was some sponsorship
or other relationship involving permission between the University of
Alabama and the artist. 79 Notably, in this case, there was a
75

Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 2012 WL 7179374, at *7 (C.D.
Cal. 2012). The district court also alternatively found that defendants’ use was
covered by the descriptive fair use doctrine. Id. at *8.
76
Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D.
Ala. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 683 F.3d 1266, 1283 (11th Cir. 2012).
77
New Life Art, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d. at 1244-46.
78
Id. at 1244-46.
79
Id. at 1249.
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relationship between the University of Alabama and the artist, and
there was a license in place between the two parties.80 Part of the
dispute centered on whether the colors of the uniforms of the players
were covered by the license.81 However, the district court decided in
favor of the artist, noting that the case involved “fine art” and that the
artist’s work was protected artistic expression, fair use or protected by
the First Amendment.82 The Court noted that the artist’s paintings and
the limited edition prints were not infringing, but that other
merchandise such as T-shirts, cups, mugs, posters and calendars may
be infringing.83 Over two years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit applied the Rogers v. Grimaldi test and found that
Moore’s work did not constitute a violation of the Lanham Act.84 The
court reasoned that:
Therefore, we have no hesitation in joining our sister
circuits by holding that we should construe the Lanham
Act narrowly when deciding whether an artistically
expressive work infringes a trademark. This requires
that we carefully “weigh the public interest in free
expression against the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion.” An artistically expressive use of
a trademark will not violate the Lanham Act “unless the
use of the mark has no artistic relevance to the
underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic
relevance, unless it explicitly misleads as to the source
or the content of the work.”
In this case, we readily conclude that Moore's
paintings, prints, and calendars are protected under the
Rogers test. The depiction of the University's uniforms
in the content of these items is artistically relevant to
the expressive underlying works because the uniforms'
colors and designs are needed for a realistic portrayal of
famous scenes from Alabama football history. Also
there is no evidence that Moore ever marketed an
unlicensed item as “endorsed” or “sponsored” by the
University, or otherwise explicitly stated that such
items were affiliated with the University. Moore's
80

Id. at 1244.
Id.
82
Id. at 1250.
83
Id.
84
Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, 683 F.3d 1266, 1278-79 (11th Cir.
2012).
81
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paintings, prints, and calendars very clearly are
embodiments of artistic expression, and are entitled to
full First Amendment protection. The extent of his use
of the University's trademarks is their mere inclusion
(their necessary inclusion) in the body of the image
which Moore creates to memorialize and enhance a
particular play or event in the University's football
history. Even if “some members of the public would
draw the incorrect inference that [the University] had
some involvement with [Moore's paintings, prints, and
calendars,] ... that risk of misunderstanding, not
engendered by any overt [or in this case even implicit]
claim ... is so outweighed by the interest in artistic
expression as to preclude” any violation of the Lanham
Act.85
Importantly, the court did not address whether a trademark defense
applied to the use of the marks on mugs and “other mundane objects.”
This leaves open the question of whether Moore’s work applied to
these other items would pass muster under Rogers v. Grimaldi.
Indeed, if Moore or another artist created a work on a “mundane
object” that work may fail the Rogers v. Grimaldi test if consumers
would believe a license was required to create the work.
Under the facts of both cases it is easy to understand how potential
“artists” or small companies with limited resources could be
concerned. In one case, a party may not use a character even if it
conceivably falls in the public domain to create new works because of
a trademark merchandising right. In the other, a party may not create
paintings of scenes in real life that have trademarks in them because
under trademark law a trademark owner may claim a merchandising
right. Under either case, there is a possibility that if there is an
expected merchandising market because of the nature of the good then
there may be a trademark infringement without a defense. The
slippery slope seems clear and there are several problems with this
type of reasoning and extending it. First, how do you determine what
is merchandise or not? Maybe you could limit it to “traditional
promotional goods” but what if LEGO sells plastic LEGO pieces, and
then expands into creating characters, television shows, motion
pictures, video games, and other audio-visual works traditionally
protected by copyright law? Trademark protection has expanded to
include motion marks, colors and sounds. Related to this question is
whether LEGO will continue to control those works under a trademark
85

Id. (citations omitted).

2! 98!

WAKE!FOREST!J.!
BUS.!&!INTELL.!PROP.!L.%

[VOL.!13!

merchandising theory even if the copyright expires in various works.
And, as mentioned before, the question of which “copyrighted work”
is the referenced work is a complicated issue. Moreover, in the
context of aggressive trademark tactics, an artist with minimal funding
or a small business with limited funding may not litigate and may
choose to capitulate. A robust aesthetic functionality defense may
provide a disincentive to or eliminate overreaching trademark claims.
Accordingly, instead of relying on a defense based on the First
Amendment or a substitutionary test for the likelihood of confusion,86
courts could rely on defensive aesthetic functionality to justify or
excuse an alleged infringer’s use. As long as there is no attempt to
suggest some “official” licensing relationship, aesthetic functionality
would preserve a producer’s ability to sell formerly copyright
protected work as utilitarian functionality does for patent. Robust
competition is preserved as consumers will have more choice and
lower prices, and creativity is not stifled. And, the copyright owner
has received their reward and the work, as in the A.V.E.L.A. case,
should pass to the public domain.
In the University of Alabama case, defensive aesthetic
functionality could excuse or justify the artist’s use and also hold the
University of Alabama’s marks as valid. The University of Alabama
thus cannot stop the artist’s use because to do so would effectively
86

Notably, the jurisprudence concerning the First Amendment and trademark
law is not entirely clear. There are multiple potential tests that courts may apply;
although the leading test appears to be the test from Rogers v. Grimaldi. Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). In that case, the court examined the
application of trademark law to a title of an expressive work. Id. The court stated
that it needed to balance the expressive interest of the First Amendment against
potential consumer confusion. Id. Unfortunately, the Circuits have at least three
different ways of applying the Rogers v. Grimaldi test. See Nicolas Macri, Holding
Back the (Crimson) Tide of Trademark Litigation, The Eleventh Circuit Shields
Works of Art from Lanham Act Claims in New Life Art, 54 B.C.L. REV. 71, 78-80
(2013). Other Circuits have considered the First Amendment interest in different
ways in trademark cases. See e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d
397, 402−03 (8th Cir. 1987); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109
F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996). Importantly, in a recent case, a district
court applied the Rogers test to dismiss a trademark complaint. Rebellion Devs. Ltd.
v. Stardock Entm’t, Inc., 2013 WL 1944888, at *3-6 (E.D. Mich. 2013). The use of
Rogers to end a trademark litigation early is a welcome development. For additional
discussion of the Rebellion Devs. Ltd. case, see Rebecca Tushnet, Sins of a
Trademark Owner: Rogers Applies Regardless of Intent, REBECCA TUSHNET’S
43(B)LOG (May 23, 2013), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2013/05/sins-of-trademarkowner-rogers-applies.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=Feed%3A+RebeccaTushnets43blog+%28Rebecca+Tushnet%27s+43%28
B%29log%29.
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allow the University of Alabama to foreclose anyone from using their
marks. This would not only place creators in the market for producing
expressive works at some competitive disadvantage, but would also
wholly preempt the market for the creation of those works in certain
mediums.
A problem with using defensive aesthetic functionality, as alluded
to earlier, is attempting to ascertain what is a non-reputation related
disadvantage, because arguably the markets created for Betty Boop
merchandise or works, and University of Alabama merchandise or
works, are driven by demand created in part because of the popularity
of the marks or copyrighted works. Arguably, this demand is all about
a reputation related advantage. However, the argument cannot be that
broad or defensive aesthetic functionality would never apply. The
application of the defense would not fulfill its function of protecting
competition. Consumers may purchase the item because of loyalty or
some decorative reason;87 although inquiring into the motivations of
consumers is unlikely to provide much certainty with respect to the
application of the doctrine unless there was a presumption favoring the
application of aesthetic functionality.
The final case is the Louboutin case involving a shiny, lacquered
red on the outsoles of high-priced, high-heeled shoes, which
Louboutin claims as its trademark.88 In this case the district court
denied a preliminary injunction, in part, by essentially adopting a per
se rule that a supposed trademark holder cannot use trademark law to
control a single color in the fashion industry.89 The district court
applied the aesthetic functionality doctrine, but not the defensive
type.90 In highlighting the importance of color in the fashion industry,
the court allowed competitors to use this color (or shade)—even on
outsoles—because it is necessary for them to compete.91 The court
noted several reasons why a competitor may want to use red—that are
not reputation related—red symbolizes energy, it’s engaging, it’s sexy,
it attracts men to women who wear these shoes. 92 Moreover,
competitors need the color to create coordinating outfits.93 The court

87

Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th
Cir. 1980).
88
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d
445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
89
Id. at 457.
90
Id. at 453.
91
Id. at 453-54.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 454.
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likened the importance of color to fashion as the same as fine art.94
The court reasoned that:
Painting and fashion design stem from related creative
stock, and thus share many central features. Both find
common ground and goals in two vital fields of human
endeavor, art and commerce. For the ultimate ends
they serve in these spheres, both integrally depend on
creativity. Fashion designers and painters both regard
themselves, and others regard them, as being engaged
in labors for which artistic talent, as well as personal
expression as a means to channel it, are vital.
Moreover, the items generated by both painters and
fashion designers acquire commercial value as they
gain recognition. Louboutin himself would probably
feel his sense of honneur wounded if he were
considered merely a cobbler, rather than an artiste.
But, as a matter differing only in degrees and order of
priority, Louboutin and Picasso both may also be
properly labeled as men of commerce, each in his
particular market.
The creative energies of painter and fashion designer
are devoted to appeal to the same sense in the beholder
and wearer: aesthetics. Both strive to please patrons
and markets by creating objects that not only serve a
commercial purpose but also possess ornamental beauty
(subjectively perceived and defined). . . .
But, as an offshoot of color, perhaps most crucial
among the features painting and fashion design share as
commerce and art, are two interrelated qualities that
both creative fields depend upon to thrive, and indeed
to survive: artistic freedom and fair competition. In
both forms, the greatest range for creative outlet exists
with its highest, most vibrant and all-encompassing
energies where every pigment of the spectrum is freely
available for the creator to apply, where every painter
and designer in producing artful works enjoys equal
freedom to pick and choose color from every streak of
the rainbow. The contrary also holds. Placing off limit
signs on any given chromatic band by allowing one
artist or designer to appropriate an entire shade and
94

Id. at 452-54.
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hang an ambiguous threatening cloud over a swath of
other neighboring hues, thus delimiting zones where
other imaginations may not veer or wander, would
unduly hinder not just commerce and competition, but
art as well.
The thrust and implications of the Court's analogy are
clear. No one would argue that a painter should be
barred from employing a color intended to convey a
basic concept because another painter, while using that
shade as an expressive feature of a similar work, also
staked out a claim to it as a trademark in that context.
If as a principle this proposition holds as applied to
high art, it should extend with equal force to high
fashion. The law should not countenance restraints that
would interfere with creativity and stifle competition by
one designer, while granting another a monopoly
invested with the right to exclude use of an ornamental
or functional medium necessary for freest and most
productive artistic expression by all engaged in the
same enterprise.95
Unfortunately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
determined that the district court’s decision concerning aesthetic
functionality was flawed.96 Specifically, the Second Circuit decided
that the district court’s per se rule that a single color could not be
protected in an industry was inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Qualitex decision.97 Importantly, the Second Circuit did seem
to indicate that Qualitex could be read to allow a per se rule in an
industry, but stated that was “doubtful.”98 The Second Circuit also
limited Louboutin’s trademark to the lacquered red color with a
contrasting upper sole.99 This limitation allowed the Second Circuit to
find that Yves Saint Laurent was not infringing Louboutin’s
trademark, while at the same time upholding Louboutin’s
95

Id. at 452-53.
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 212 (2d Cir. 2012). For additional discussion of the Louboutin decisions, see
generally Reanna L. Kuitse, Christian Louboutin’s “Red Sole Mark” Saved to
Remain Louboutin’s Footmark in High Fashion, For Now . . ., 46 IND. L. REV. 241
(2013); Alexandra J. Schultz, Looks Can Be Deceiving: Aesthetic Functionality in
Louboutin and Beyond, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 261 (2012).
97
Christian Louboutin S.A., 696 F.3d at 223.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 226-27.
96
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trademark.100 Courts should follow the analysis of the district court in
Louboutin and apply a “per se” approach to numerous types of marks,
with the aesthetic functionality doctrine clearing the way for more
creativity, and competition in specific industries.
Aesthetic
functionality could serve as a policy lever, similar to those in patent
law,101 to prohibit overreaching in trademark law in specific industries.
V. CONCLUSION
Trademark holders vigorously protect their marks—and they have
every reason to do so under trademark law and policy. However,
trademark holders may essentially act as a “bully” when they
overreach, and when they do, it is easily understandable how they can
stifle artistic expression and creativity under the facts of these cases or
a simple extension of the facts. A struggling artist or small company
may not have the resources to fight the University of Alabama and
may just give in and stop using the mark. Notably, the artist in the
University of Alabama case paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in
attorneys’ fees—how many struggling artists can afford to engage in
years of litigation with such a high dollar cost.102 A strong aesthetic
functionality defense may ensure a robust competitive market for
artistic works in many mediums including those in supposed
merchandising markets. While some circuits do not recognize the
aesthetic functionality doctrine at all or apply it very narrowly—the
time has come for courts to reexamine the doctrine because the stakes
are high.
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